



## THE SUDANESE CIVIL WAR AND THE RISING INFLUENCE OF MIDDLE EASTERN POWERS

12.5. 2025 Richard Klauber<sup>1</sup>

### Annotation

*The civil war between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and the SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has claimed several tens of thousands of victims, over 14 million displaced people, and approximately 3 million foreign refugees.*

*Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, also known as "Hemedti", is gaining more allies, and the war is turning in his favor for now. Hemedti and his RSF are gaining territory in the area south of the capital, Khartoum, and in the east of the country in the Darfur region. In Sudan, as mentioned earlier, this caused a food crisis in addition to the migration, with over 30 million inhabitants in May 2025 ending up in famine.<sup>i,ii,iii</sup>*

### Introduction

The Sudanese civil war has turned into one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world in a very short time. This war is a power struggle within Sudan and between foreign forces interfering in this conflict.

These countries mainly include regional powers such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran. In addition to them, the Russian Federation is also active among the arms suppliers, prolonging the war due to its interests in the country.

The RSF led the first year of the war, but the forces began to turn after the Russian Federation started supplying weapons to the SAF, which launched a successful offensive in the capital, Khartoum. The RSF is currently carrying out genocide in the territories of Darfur and Kordofan, causing an exodus of local populations. The RSF, formerly known as

Janjaweed, carried out similar acts in the Second Sudanese Civil War and the Darfur War.

### The development of the war until today

On April 15, 2023, power struggles broke out in the capital, Khartoum. The reason is likely to be a conflict of interest between Generals Hemedti and al-Burhan, who disagreed on who would govern Sudan. To this day, it is not clear who attacked first.


These disputes were preceded by the overthrow of longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, which took place in 2019 and began with popular protests, and then the armed forces staged a coup. Civilian protesters wanted to establish democracy and formed a joint military-civilian government, but it was overthrown in October 2021, and al-Burhan seized power. From then on, the rivalry between Hemedti and al-Burhan began.<sup>iv</sup>

Since the beginning of the fighting, the RSF paramilitary units have taken the initiative. RSF cemented its position in the capital, Khartoum, and further invaded the important agricultural province of Gezira in December 2023. The attack on Gezira province was one of the great successes of the RSF in this war, an important battle for the provincial capital, Wad Madani, took place here.<sup>v</sup>

The RSF launched a surprisingly swift offensive and captured El Sharafa, Abu Haraz, El Ghanoum, and the El Riyadh and Hantoub neighborhoods located east of the provincial capital. The RSF found itself 1.5 km from Wad Madani, the city was under siege, which meant its fall. The SAF carried out several air strikes and partially withdrew before the RSF attack. The siege caused a mass exodus of residents, who fled to nearby provinces.<sup>vi</sup>

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The battle did not last long, as the SAF withdrew. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the SAF leadership began investigating the "surprise withdrawal" from Wad Madani, which allowed the RSF to win easily. Military commanders are mainly criticized for "negligence". After the conquest, the city's infrastructure stopped working, and the city became a "ghost town". It is likely to be the reputation of the RSF, which has committed genocide in the past, is why locals are afraid of the presence of soldiers of the paramilitary group.<sup>vii</sup>

So far, one of the most important, but also the most brutal battles of the civil war in Sudan has been the Battle of El Geneina. This city, located in eastern Sudan in the Darfur region located close to the neighboring country of Chad, was a strategic center for the SAF with the nearby Ardamata military base.

The RSF attack began just as quickly and unexpectedly at the end of May 2023 with the ambush of the SAF convoy and SAF's allied militias, which were SLM-MM (Sudan Liberation Movement – Minni Minawi), JEM (Justice and Equality Movement), and GSLF (Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces). The RSF and allied Arab militias took advantage of the element of surprise and occupied the outskirts of El Geneina, the towns of Misterei and Kulbus. To control the road to neighboring Chad, the RSF has prevented major migration from the country.<sup>viii</sup>

Migrants fleeing to Chad, mostly of Masalit ethnicity, were often beaten and killed by RSF soldiers and allied militias. Some ran north to the SAF Ardamata base. By mid-June, Geneina was almost completely besieged. On 22 June, Geneina fell, and the RSF celebrated a crucial victory.<sup>ix</sup>

Before the city fell, the governor of West Darfur declared the massacre of the Masalits a genocide and condemned the actions of the RSF and allied militias. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested by RSF soldiers, tortured, and eventually killed.<sup>x</sup>

In the litterfall of 2023, the paramilitary RSF occupied the Armadata, which was the headquarters of the 15th

SAF Division, which fled to Chad and laid down its arms. This happened after a bloody battle near the town of Nyala. After the occupation of the base, ethnic cleansing continued, killing Masalit leader Mohammed Arbaba and his son. Mohammed Arbaba was one of the oldest Native Administration leaders in Darfur, where he had served since 1959. This was followed by mass arrests of his followers and other refugees from the city of El Geneina.<sup>xi</sup>


After a series of military successes, Hemedti embarked on a foreign trip at the end of December 2023 and the beginning of January 2024, where he established diplomatic relations with the heads of African countries. Hemedti was welcomed in South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Rwanda. On each visit, Hemedti was greeted as the head of state of Sudan despite the recent massacres carried out by the RSF.

In January 2024, Hemedti and former Prime Minister of Sudan Abdallah Hamdok, who led the Taqaddum (Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces) in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, signed a joint ceasefire declaration. Furthermore, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit on the Sudan agenda was held in Entebbe, Uganda, where Hemedti also attended.

However, the foreign ministry of the Sudanese interim government condemned the actions as "violating Sudan's sovereignty".<sup>xii</sup>

Nevertheless, almost nothing has changed since Hemedti signed the declaration. Humanitarian aid is scarce, and the RSF has not complied with the main part of the agreement, namely the release of 451 prisoners (at that time) of war.

From signing the ceasefire with Taqqadum until August 2024, RSF has intensified its military operations, expanding into Gadarif State and moving towards Nile State and the Merowe region. The RSF has also made progress in other parts of the country. Since then, the UN and the African Union have also intensified their peace talks activities.<sup>xiii</sup>



The SAF's next offensive in September 2024 was successfully carried out by advancing into the capital, Khartoum, and gaining a link with the nearby city of Omdurman, the country's second-largest city. The SAF and allied militias also drove the RSF out of the city of Kulburs in Darfur. In the southeast of the country, they captured the capital of the White Nile state, the city of Sennar, and regained the strategic agricultural area of Jebel Moya.

In this offensive, the SAF showed that it was still capable of turning the tide of the war and also showed good cooperation with the Allied militias in the offensive near the town of Sennar and the Jebel Moya area. SAF allies deployed in this offensive, such as Darfur Joint Forces, al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigade, Popular Resistance, and Justice and Equality Movement reinforcements. The offensive was also successful in the speed of advance, with the SAF and allies managing to capture the aforementioned gains from September 7 to October 4, 2024.

Proof of SAF's success was the delivery of 15 aircraft from Egypt and Russia at the end of 2024.<sup>xiv</sup>

The SAF offensive from January to April successfully drove RSF forces from the capital, Khartoum. The headquarters of the National Intelligence Service was liberated. Among the strategic points in the capital captured by the SAF were the headquarters of the Central Bank of Sudan, as well as the Republican Palace, the prewar seat of the government.

Hundreds of RSF soldiers were killed as they fled the city. This victory marked a significant turning point in the war for the SAF, as Khartoum had been one of the most intense battlegrounds and had been a frontline since the beginning of the nearly two-year war.

Much of Khartoum and its sister cities of Omdurman and Khartoum North, along with other cities elsewhere in the country, were retaken by the SAF.<sup>xv</sup>

After the SAF captured most of Khartoum, it focused on northern Darfur, where it shelled the city of Tora.

Representatives of the SAF state army do not want to allow the division of Sudan, with Hemedti ruling in Darfur and Burhan ruling in the eastern half of the country. Burhan visited the presidential palace in Khartoum shortly after its capture.

Shortly after the capture of the presidential palace, Yasser al-Atta, assistant to the SAF commander-in-chief to Chadian President Mahamat Kaka, threatened that the army "will take retaliatory action against Mahamat Kaka.... We warn him that the airports of N'Djamena and Amdjarass are legitimate targets for the Sudanese Armed Forces."

The Chadian ministry responded by saying that the statements "can be interpreted as a declaration of war if actions follow them."<sup>xvi</sup>


The RSF refused to acknowledge the defeat in Khartoum. RSF official Basha Tabiq, an advisor to the commander on the X network, questioned the victory and claimed that the state forces had achieved "no victory". He further argued that "for military strategic reasons, the leadership decided to reposition our forces in Omdurman due to various logistical and operational factors."

The RSF is meanwhile losing territory in Khartoum, Al-Jazira, White Nile, North Kordofan, Sennar, and Blue Nile states.<sup>xvii</sup>

Hemedti said that it was "strategic repositioning decisions made collectively by the military leadership."

He threatened to come back stronger and rejected dialogue with the SAF, saying, "We will not engage in dialogue or agreements with them, only the gun will decide."

The war is therefore far from over.<sup>xviii</sup>



## Timeline

Third Sudanese civil war  
throughout years

**2019 End of Omar al-Bashir's reign**

RSF, SAF and civil protests overthrew Omar al Bashir a former dictator

**2021 October, second coup**

Prime minister Hamdok, who led newly formed government where military and civil power was balanced was overthrown by Hemedti and Burhan

**2023 April, a war broke out**

Power dispute between Hamedti and Burhan invoked a conflict, SAF and RSF clash for the first time in capital city of Sudan, Khartoum

**2023 May - June, genocide in Geneina**

The bloody siege of the city of Geneina resulted in the genocide of the Masalite ethnic group

**2023 December, fall of Wad Madani**

RSF leads a succesfull offensive in Gezira state capturing the capital, Wad Madani

**2024 September - October, first counteroffensive of SAF**

SAF Conquers much of the Sennar state and cement its positions in Khartoum

**2024 April - present, siege of El Fasher**

RSF surrounded the last city in Darfur under SAF control, the siege of this city became one of the biggest humanitarian atrocities in the whole war

**2025, May - the UN top court ruling**

The United Nations' top court dismissed a case accusing the United Arab Emirates of inciting genocide in Sudan by supporting the RSF paramilitary forces



## War crimes, humanitarian crisis, and the current situation

The war has much larger dimensions than at first glance attributed to it. Over 61,000 victims are attributed to the state of Khartoum alone, which is probably only a fraction of the victims. The highest number of deaths is in the territories of Darfur and Kordofan, where there are no estimates of the number of deaths yet, but it should be over 90% of all war casualties. In addition to famine and disease, which are ubiquitous in these areas, the majority of deaths are caused by violence. The fighting causes 69% of casualties in Darfur and 80% in Kordofan.

However, the war is ignored by the media and overshadowed by the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. There is a lack of diplomatic efforts to end the war, and humanitarian aid to the sick, starving, and wounded Sudanese people. States such as France and the UAE are violating the arms embargo imposed by the UN and thus supporting fighting and war crimes.<sup>xx</sup>

Several war crimes took place during the war, and the largest concentration of these crimes occurred during the siege and after the siege of the city of El Geneina. The genocide and exodus of the local population were largely caused by Arab militias and RSF allies during the siege of the city.

The killings began during the siege of the city when mortars were used to shell neighborhoods that are inhabited by the Masalit ethnicity. After the capture of the city, mainly men of Masalit ethnicity, who were perceived from the point of view of the occupiers as potential soldiers of enemy militias, were massacred. RSF members helped smooth over the ceilings after the massacre, burying the dead on the outskirts of the city.

Furthermore, important personalities of the Masalit ethnicity were killed. According to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 290,000 people have fled the city to nearby Chad. According to the U.N. Children's Agency (UNICEF), the city of El Geneina

had a population of around 500,000 before the siege. RSF soldiers took part in mass rapes, during which women as teenagers and possibly younger were raped. The exact number of women raped is not yet known.<sup>xxi</sup>

A similar, but less serious situation is in the capital Khartoum and the neighboring populous city of Omdurman. During the fighting, Khartoum lost half of its hospitals, which had to be closed or destroyed. In nearby Omdurman, only one hospital remained operational.

In Khartoum, up to half of the population has left, and most of those who remain in the city are mainly those who cannot leave because of their physical condition, i.e., the elderly and disabled. Refugees from the eastern regions of the country, Darfur and Kordofan, where ethnic cleansing took place, were imprisoned in Omdurman when the RSF held the city.<sup>xxii</sup>

A big problem, especially for the surrounding countries, is the mass migration of Sudanese. At the beginning of 2025, the total number of displaced people was 14.6 million, and the number of people in need of assistance was 30.4 million, according to the International Rescue Committee.<sup>xxiii</sup>

Egypt hosts the largest number of these Sudanese migrants, at 1.5 million, followed by Chad with 773,662 refugees and South Sudan with 349,935 refugees, but most of the South Sudanese refugees are refugees who were hosted by Sudan (744,412) and are now returning. Libya (256,000), Uganda (71,215), and Ethiopia (43,159) also host significant numbers of Sudanese refugees.<sup>xxiv</sup>

The last town in the area, Darfur and Kordofan, with more than a million inhabitants held by government forces, is besieged by the RSF paramilitary organization and allied militias, it is the city of El Fasher. If this city falls, the entire eastern part of the country will come under the control of the RSF, which will then be able to reinforce the front near the capital, Khartoum, and the southwest front.



Hemedti is aware of this, which is why RSF units have intensified pressure on the city and destroyed or looted several hospitals. Residents of El Fasher are suffering from a shortage of medicine, food, water, and fuel. There are over 45,000 pregnant women in the city who are not receiving medical care.

There are rumors that Hemedti would try to tear off the eastern part of the country and declare himself ruler of the new country. But U.S. Ambassador Tom Perillo has strongly rejected this, calling for a ceasefire as the last hope for the local population, who have been living under siege for months.<sup>xxv</sup>

El Fasher has been under siege for months, with residential areas being bombed and the RSF cutting off humanitarian aid to the city. The bombing of residential areas has forced residents to take refuge in underground shelters, which they often dig themselves.

The RSF is targeting the Zaghawa ethnic group because they have joined the city's defense. According to the RSF and allied Arab militias, this has violated their neutrality. The fall of El Fasher is therefore an existential threat to them, which could mean another genocide, this time against the Zaghawa ethnic group.<sup>xxvi</sup>

The most affected area besides El Fasher is Kordofan, specifically the state of South Kordofan, which until recently was controlled by local militia – Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which is mainly made up of the Nuba ethnic group and is now being persecuted and killed by RSF soldiers.

The cities of Habila and Fayu and the surrounding villages have become the center of these events (at the beginning of the year 2025), and there are cases where RSF soldiers take local women as sex slaves. In addition, looting by the occupiers is common. After that, already disarmed SAF soldiers and state policemen are killed here, and ethnic cleansing against the Nuba ethnic group also takes place here. The

surrounding towns and villages become a wasteland where it is impossible to live.<sup>xxvii</sup>




(cities in south Kordofan after the RSF shelling)

## Foreign powers involved in the conflict

This war has turned into an arms race, in which mainly regional powers are involved. After a while, both warring parties gained the support of some influential countries that have different interests here. The SAF is militarily supported by Iran, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Belarus, Serbia, and China. The SAF has recently received political and military support from Egypt.

The Russian Federation has a more complex strategy than the other supporters mentioned. Russia is seeking a base in the Red Sea, so as a state, it supports the SAF. However, for access to minerals, he also supports the RSF militarily, politically, and



economically through the Wagner Group. Saudi Arabia supports the SAF because of the allied Wahhabi militia that is involved in the fighting for Khartoum.

The RSF has military support mainly from the UAE, which smuggles weapons into Darfur and Kordofan via Chad, followed by France and the aforementioned Wagner Group. France and the UAE have close cooperation when it comes to arms sales to Sudan. The UAE supplies its Nimr Ajban combat vehicles (APCs), which are equipped with the Galix Hal system, manufactured by French companies Lacroix Defense and KNDS France. France thereby violates the embargo imposed by the EU and the UN.<sup>xxx,xxxi,xxxii</sup>

The UAE denies the accusations of arming the RSF, although its forces were most likely seen using satellite imagery in the Chadian city of Amdjarass using a Wagner Group's IL-76 transport aircraft, which the UAE uses for shipping arms to Sudan. The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that it has built field hospitals in the cities of Amdjarass and Abeche, which are located near the Sudanese border, and is supplying them.<sup>xxxiii</sup>

In March 2025, the UAE was sued by the Sudanese Transitional Council (TSC) at the International Court of Justice, where the Emirates were accused of violating the Genocide Convention through their alleged military, financial, and political support for the RSF. They were aiding and abetting genocides against the Masalit and Nuba ethnicities.

The UAE's foreign minister dismissed the case as "feeble media maneuvers". However, the UN considered the arms supplies to the RSF to be "credible". In January 2025, US senators also publicly confirmed that the UAE was arming the RSF, which contradicts previous assurances that the UAE had given to the Biden administration. The UAE is reportedly using its base in Bosaso in the separatist Somali region of Puntland, supporting its separation from Somalia.<sup>xxxiv</sup>

In the Sudanese war, there is a political clash between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Emiratis not only want business from the RSF, but they are also trying to undermine the interim Sudanese government by confirming the Hemedti government. Clear evidence of this is the announcement of a parallel RSF government in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. The Emirates completed a \$1.5 billion loan to Kenya the same week.

The Emirates compete with the Saudis on several issues. The Saudis are challenging Dubai's position as a business center through policies that designate Riyadh as the main business center in the region. They have competing megaprojects, they have disputes over production quotas within OPEC+. They even have maritime disputes over the Yasat Islands in the Persian Gulf.<sup>xxxv</sup>

While the UAE conceals its interference in the war in Sudan, Russia is intensively negotiating its base in the Red Sea, the entire coast is in the hands of the SAF, so it has to negotiate with the SAF. Proof of this intensity is, for instance, the statement of Russian Deputy Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, who promised "unrestricted qualitative military aid", which includes modern Su-30 and Su-35 fighters, or the S-400 air defense system.

Russian fuel also plays a role in prolonging the conflict, as the Wagner Group has long supplied fuel through Chad to RSF, and this fuel also travels across the Red Sea to SAF-controlled territories.<sup>xxxvi</sup>


Russia has turned its foreign policy towards Sudan for more reasons than just the Red Sea port. Moscow's main goal is to separate the cooperation of Ukrainian special forces that have carried out operations against the Wagner Group in Sudan. After a visit by Deputy Minister Bogdanov, the SAF and the Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC), which acts as Sudan's transitional government, said that cooperation with Ukrainian intelligence has ended.

The RSF, which traded weapons with the Wagner group and paid for their supplies in gold, is now more



isolated from the Wagner Group. The Russian Federation is increasingly leaning towards the SAF in the war. The RSF thus becomes dependent on arms supplies from the UAE and France. But the Russians have an even more important reason, and that is to support their forces in the African landlocked countries. The Russians already have bases in Libya and want another state, connected to these countries. Finally, Russia is trying to align its support with its ally, Iran.<sup>xxxvii</sup>

Iran recently restored relations with Sudan, which were very good until 2016 before being abruptly ended due to Iran's rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Currently, however, SAF enjoys Iranian support, and Iran is taking advantage of the opportunity to gain influence there. SAF benefits from Iranian support, mainly due to the supply of Iranian drones such as Mohajer-6, Zayil-3, and Ababil-3. After some of these drones were shot down by RSF troops, the SAF claimed to have acquired them on the black market and withheld Iranian support. With the help of these drones, SAF forces were able to get several of their units out of encirclement in the cities of Omdurman and Khartoum, which started the SAF counteroffensive.<sup>xxxviii</sup>



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## Peace talks and possible solutions to the Sudanese conflict

The United States has sent experienced diplomat Tom Perriello, who is leading talks in Geneva. U.S. diplomacy has already achieved success in mitigating the humanitarian catastrophe, securing the crossings of Port Sudan from the sea and a border crossing Adre from Chad, from where humanitarian aid is now flowing.

However, the negotiations in Geneva have been unsuccessful, the problem is that the SAF did not want to attend or send a delegation. SAF did not want to participate in the talks for several reasons. The first is that the SAF rejects the UAE's presence in peace talks because it supplies the RSF with weapons. The second reason is that the TSC (Transitional Sovereignty Council) should act according to the SAF because the SAF is only a state army and not a government.<sup>xi</sup>


The third and final reason is that it is unlikely to force the RSF or SAF to make concessions when both warring parties have plenty of power and the possibility of shifting the war in their favor.

The talks that preceded the Geneva talks took place in Jeddah and were also only partially successful, with the SAF and the RSF concluding humanitarian agreements based on the Geneva Conventions and a short-term ceasefire.<sup>xli</sup>

There is not enough pressure on the UAE to stop supplying the RSF, so the war is still going on, even though the UAE is the only major supplier of weapons, this is enough to ensure the RSF's military successes so far. The Raoul Wallenberg Center for Human Rights led a campaign against the UAE, intending to lead it to the International Court of Justice.<sup>xlii</sup>

Still, the United Arab Emirates recently promised to stop selling weapons in the future. They sent this message in a letter to the White House, but the letter also said that they are not sending weapons to Sudan even now. Brett McGurk, White House coordinator





for Middle East policy, signed the letter and offered to evaluate the pledge.<sup>xliii</sup> We know from the previous chapter that Washington evaluated the UAE's announcement negatively and condemned the UAE for smuggling weapons into Sudan.

The vote on the UN resolution on Sudan was a failure because the resolution was vetoed by the Russian Federation. The proposal of the states of Sierra Leone and Great Britain demanding a ceasefire has sparked a dispute between Russia and Great Britain. Russia has accused the UK of attempting to interfere in Sudan, and the UK has called Russia's veto a "disgrace".

The Russians argue that the war should be resolved in the presence of the SAF. The SAF wanted a clause condemning the UAE's support for the RSF. The Sudanese interim government has also demanded that the RSF be designated as a terrorist organization.<sup>xliv</sup>

The president of Türkiye also offered to hold peace talks to resolve the dispute between the UAE and Sudan. Erdogan has offered to mediate, building on the recent diplomatic success in negotiations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Erdogan has vowed to preserve Sudan's sovereignty and prevent the country from becoming an arena for foreign powers.

During the TSC resolution, Burhan stated that he was open to any role Türkiye would play in the conflict, said he trusted President Türkiye and called for more investment from Türkiye.<sup>xlv</sup>

The United Nations' top court on May 5 dismissed a case accusing the United Arab Emirates of inciting genocide in Sudan by supporting the RSF paramilitary forces because it "manifestly lacks jurisdiction." The International Court of Justice refused to issue provisional emergency measures against the UAE by a vote of 14-2 and struck the case out by a vote of 9-7.

This was because, although both Sudan and the UAE are signatories to the 1948 Genocide Convention, the UAE chose not to participate in a key clause in 2005

that allows countries to sue each other at the International Court of Justice.

In its summary, the International Court said that "its statute prevents it from taking any position on the merits of the claims made by Sudan" but that it was "deeply concerned about the unfolding human tragedy in Sudan."<sup>xlvi</sup>

## Conclusion

There will be no short-term and quick solution to the war in Sudan. Especially because of the United Arab Emirates and the Russian Federation, which are delaying the conflict or directly preventing its end.


After the Battle of Khartoum, we can say that the war has turned in the SAF's favor. The Russians, Iranians, and Saudis will probably rearm the Emirates, but this does not necessarily mean that the war will end, the RSF and allied militias may switch to guerrilla tactics, and the war may drag on for many years.

As for the humanitarian crisis, the situation may worsen not so much in Darfur and Kordofan, where it cannot get much worse than it is now, but in the southern and southeastern states of the country, in states such as White Nile and Gezira, which are strategically important due to their fertile soil and therefore logistical support for both warring sides.

As for the city of El Fasher, which the RSF must capture as quickly as possible in order to stay in the war. The SAF will try to liberate El Fasher from the siege and if they succeed, victory for the SAF will be within reach. On the other hand, if El Fasher falls, the RSF would free up a lot of forces to try to recapture Khartoum and Omdurman.

According to the above hypotheses, we can conclude that Hemedti is running out of time. He must conquer El Fasher quickly and secure a powerful ally who will supply him with weapons. This ally could be Great Britain, which could help RSF due to disputes with the Russian Federation, or the aforementioned France, which has already sold some systems to RSF.

But the humanitarian crisis could worsen even further than it is now. The retreating RSF troops could retaliate with a far more aggressive genocide than they



are currently carrying out. Just as if El Fasher were conquered, the Zaghawa people are next in line.

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