Comments on the protests in Iran
Date of publication: January 17, 2026
In mid-January 2026, Filip Sommer, director of the Prague Center for Middle East Relations (PCMR) at CEVRO University, commented on the current protests in Iran. The comments can be found on websites such as INFO.CZ, Česká televize, HNOnline.sk, iRozhlas, Denik.cz, and České Noviny.
The situation remains tense and turbulent, and a number of internal factors or external interventions could quickly escalate the situation and lead to new scenarios.
Context
Current Situation in the Country
It is unclear whether the protests are continuing, as a nationwide internet shutdown has been in place since approximately 8 January. Nevertheless, available information suggests that protests in Iran have subsided or ended, primarily due to the regime’s repressive response and the actions of its security forces. Reports speak of thousands of deaths, although estimates vary widely, from approximately 2,500 to as many as 12,000 or even 20,000 victims, and more than 20,000 arrests. These figures are significantly higher than those recorded during the Mahsa Amini protests in 2022–2023.
At the same time, even if the protests have subsided, the key question is not whether further protests will occur, but when.
The primary trigger of the protests in Iran was economic dissatisfaction, manifested in rising inflation (a sharp depreciation of the Iranian rial), increasing unemployment, and other factors linked to the overall decline of the Iranian economy. Over time, this economic frustration became increasingly intertwined with dissatisfaction toward the political elite, particularly regarding its mode of governance, which is perceived as deeply embedded in corruption despite the country’s deteriorating economic conditions. Additional grievances include the environmental crisis, especially water shortages, including in the capital, Tehran. These problems have not disappeared; they persist and are likely to intensify.
Economic dissatisfaction is therefore closely linked to perceptions of ineffective and inadequate state governance, which protesters view as incapable of addressing the country’s long-term challenges. The ideology of the ruling regime is politically grounded primarily in the concept of “resistance” against Western imperialism, embodied mainly by the United States and Israel. As a result, the political system is oriented less toward domestic development and more toward opposition to external orders.
Prospects for Further Geopolitical Moves
The current unrest is unlikely to lead to a fundamental change in Iran’s foreign policy orientation (unless driven by external intervention); rather, it is more likely to reinforce and radicalize existing trajectories. In times of crisis, the regime tends to redirect attention toward external threats and rely on established alliance frameworks rather than reassess them.
In this context, pragmatic cooperation with Russia and China is likely to deepen. For China, Iran remains primarily an important supplier of oil and energy resources rather than a full-fledged strategic partner. In contrast, Russian–Iranian rapprochement is predominantly security- and politically driven, ranging from military cooperation to coordination in regional conflicts, and can be understood more as a “marriage of convenience” than as a deep ideological alliance.
Relations with the United States will remain highly confrontational. At present, there is also a certain probability of U.S. military action against Iran. Such a strike had been anticipated on the night of 14–15 January, but reports suggest that former President Trump’s decision to refrain from or postpone attacks resulted from negotiations involving both Arab Gulf states and Israel. A strike aimed, for example, at eliminating senior Iranian leadership would not necessarily lead to democratization or a fundamental transformation of the regime’s structures. At the same time, back-channel negotiations are likely to continue.
In my view, a significant shift in Iran’s trajectory would thus be more likely to result from external intervention rather than from internal protest dynamics. U.S. military options remain on the table.
Relations with Israel will remain confrontational and largely dependent on the broader dynamics of U.S.–Iran relations. A continued escalation spiral of low to medium intensity can be expected, including heightened rhetoric, Israeli strikes against Iranian targets and proxy structures across the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Iranian paramilitary forces in Iraq, or the Ansar Allah movement (the Houthis) in Yemen. The risk of further direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, therefore, remains real, as demonstrated by the open escalation during the 12-day war in June 2025. Here as well, developments will largely depend on whether the United States decides to enter into direct confrontation with Iran.
Impact of Sanctions and Internal Escalation on Iran’s Regional Power
Long-term international sanctions play a crucial structural role in the current crisis, significantly contributing to high inflation, the weakening of the Iranian currency, and the overall decline in living standards. The depreciation of the rial is not merely a macroeconomic issue but has direct social consequences: it increases the prices of basic foodstuffs, reduces sales for merchants, raises costs of energy and housing, and thus becomes one of the main drivers of protest mobilization.
From a geopolitical perspective, the sanctions regime also accelerates Iran’s strategic pivot toward non-Western partners, particularly Russia and China. However, this cooperation does not provide Iran with a full substitute for access to global markets and capital, but rather creates asymmetric and selective economic ties that help the regime survive without stabilizing the economy in the long term.
Regionally, Iraq is of key importance to Iran, functioning as one of the few viable economic “gateways” to the outside world, especially in the energy sector and in oil and gas trade. Iran’s influence over Iraqi political elites and government formation processes allows it to partially circumvent sanctions, but at the same time reinforces perceptions of Iran as a destabilizing regional actor, which in turn legitimizes the continuation of Western sanctions. Somewhat unexpectedly, Turkey plays a similar role in facilitating sanctions circumvention.
The most recent significant tightening of the sanctions regime occurred in connection with developments in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. Several European states, specifically the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the E3), initiated the reactivation of previously suspended sanctions through the UN Security Council’s “snapback” mechanisms, which allow for sanctions to be reinstated without the consensus of all permanent members. Although Russia and China diplomatically opposed this move, they were unable to block its implementation. It is also worth noting the newly imposed U.S. sanctions targeting certain Iranian political and military leaders.
Overall, sanctions, inflation, and currency depreciation do not operate in isolation but form a mutually reinforcing spiral that undermines the regime’s economic legitimacy, increases social tensions, and constrains the government’s room for maneuver in addressing the crisis. While sanctions do not immediately topple the regime, they increase the likelihood of recurring protest waves over the long term, particularly because broad sanctions disproportionately affect the general population rather than the ruling elite.
Drivers of Protests and the Absence of a Viable Political Alternative
The current protests in Iran are supported by a broad and socially diverse spectrum of actors whose motivations vary according to socio-economic status, profession, and region. A significant portion of the mobilization comes from lower-income and economically vulnerable groups, whose participation is driven by long-term deterioration in living conditions, high inflation, and rising poverty. In recent years, this group has become a key carrier of general dissatisfaction with governance, without necessarily sharing a coherent political vision for the country’s future.
Urban youth and students (Generation Z, aged 14–29), as well as segments of educated professional groups, including teachers, healthcare workers, and other public-sector employees, also play an important role. Women across social strata constitute a cross-cutting element of protest mobilization, with participation linked primarily to issues of legal status, social restrictions, and experiences of state control. A specific role is played by merchants and small business owners, including those in traditional bazaar environments, historically considered pillars of regime stability. Their involvement in protests, such as through shop closures, reflects dissatisfaction with currency instability, tax policies, and broader economic uncertainty.
Regionally, protests are more pronounced in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities, particularly Kurdish and Balochi regions, where long-standing socio-economic marginalization intersects with political exclusion.
Overall, the protests can be characterized as socially broad but politically fragmented, lacking unified leadership or a consensual vision of future development. The unifying factor is cumulative dissatisfaction with economic and institutional conditions rather than a clearly articulated project of systemic change.
Iran’s opposition remains deeply fragmented, internally divided, and organizationally weak. It lacks clear leadership, a common program, and consensus on objectives. Protests are largely spontaneous and decentralized, failing to articulate a unified political vision, whether oriented toward reforming the system, overthrowing it, or establishing a concrete institutional alternative.
At the same time, more reform-oriented figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, Mohammad Khatami, Mir Hossein Mousavi, or Mehdi Karroubi, could theoretically play a role in gradual reform processes. However, these actors have long been targeted by the regime, with several placed under house arrest, significantly limiting their political relevance.
Could a Return to Monarchy Be a Viable Transitional Solution? The Case of the Pahlavis
During nationwide protests, pro-monarchist slogans referencing the Pahlavi dynasty have indeed appeared. These should be understood primarily as symbolic expressions of opposition to the current regime rather than evidence of broad societal support for the restoration of the monarchy.
In this context, the most frequently mentioned opposition figure is Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah. However, he has lived in exile in the United States for nearly five decades, and his ties to Iranian society are extremely limited. Within Iran’s domestic discourse, he is perceived more as an external, Western-linked figure than as an authentic internal political actor. His close contacts with U.S. neoconservative circles and the Israeli right further reinforce this perception.
Available indications suggest that Reza Pahlavi’s actual societal support within Iran is low, likely ranging from single digits to, at most, around ten percent. Moreover, there remains a strong generational memory of the authoritarian nature of the pre-1979 monarchy, which significantly undermines the legitimacy of any potential restoration of the dynasty. On the other hand, younger generations did not experience the monarchy directly. Nevertheless, for a substantial portion of Iranian society, monarchy is not perceived as a desirable alternative but rather as an anachronism focused on the past rather than the future.
In a hypothetical post-regime scenario, Reza Pahlavi’s role would likely be limited to participation in an open political process, such as running in democratic elections, which would determine his relevance. The restoration of monarchy as a political system is therefore highly unlikely and rests more on Western media narratives than on domestic political realities.
His position was further weakened by his open support for Israeli strikes against Iran in spring 2025, which was widely perceived as crossing a sensitive threshold of national sovereignty and significantly damaged his reputation even among regime-critical Iranians. Moreover, there is no clear or full support from the United States for him as a future leader.
Overall, Iranian society remains extremely sensitive to any form of foreign intervention. Historical experiences with external interference, whether by Russia, the United Kingdom, or the United States, are deeply ingrained in Iran’s collective memory and viewed overwhelmingly negatively.
Gradual Change versus Rapid Regime Collapse
The current Iranian regime is capable of managing the crisis in the short term without undertaking major political reforms, but it is unable to resolve its root causes in the long term. Developments to date suggest that the government relies on a combination of limited economic concessions and selective personnel changes, particularly in economic management. These measures do not constitute structural reforms but rather crisis management aimed at temporarily reducing tensions.
This approach is complemented by repressive control of protests, including nationwide internet restrictions, which provides the regime with time to consolidate power and prepare for future waves of unrest. This reflects a well-established pattern of Iranian governance: a combination of co-optation, limited concessions, and coercion that enables regime survival without meaningful transformation.
At the same time, structural problems, such as economic decline, social inequalities, environmental crises, and deficits in political legitimacy, remain unresolved. As a result, the current stabilization is fragile, and protest potential is accumulating rather than dissipating. Political change can therefore be expected only in a cosmetic form, such as personnel reshuffles or minor policy adjustments, rather than a deeper recalibration of power or alteration of the regime’s foundational principles. From this perspective, the question is not whether protests will return, but when and with what intensity, unless there is external intervention.