Commentary on the Current Ceasefire Between the United States and Iran

Publication date: April 10, 2026

On April 10, 2026, Filip Sommer, Director of the Prague Center for Middle East Relations (PCMR) at CEVRO University, commented on the current ceasefire between the United States and Iran for the Czech News Agency (ČTK). The full article is available here.

Context

Although a two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran was concluded on April 8, 2026, this does not necessarily signal the end of the conflict. It is far too early to speak of stabilization in the Middle East. For the Iranian establishment, the ceasefire represents a form of victory, as its primary objective was the survival of the regime.

At the same time, American and Israeli strikes may have had the opposite effect to what was originally intended. Within Iran’s decision-making structures, the position of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and hardliners advocating a tougher stance toward the United States and Israel has been further strengthened. This may translate not only into a more assertive foreign policy, but also into increased repression of the domestic population. Moreover, the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz has once again proven to be a significant tool of pressure on the United States and its allies, particularly through its potential impact on global prices of oil, gas, and other commodities. It also cannot be ruled out that Iran will continue developing and restoring its ballistic missile program, further advance its nuclear program, and maintain support for actors within the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Promises by Donald Trump to support a new wave of anti-government protests in Iran have not materialized.

Importantly, the ceasefire does not apply to Lebanon, despite being presented as such in some official circles. Clashes between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah continue, as do Israeli airstrikes on Beirut and parts of the Beqaa Valley. Developments in Lebanon may influence the trajectory of the current fragile ceasefire, including the risk of its potential collapse.

At the same time, several states on the Arabian Peninsula continue to face drone and ballistic missile attacks attributed to Iran. The conflict may also persist in Iraq, where the political and security landscape remains deeply fragmented. Iraq has notably been the only country affected from “both sides.”

The United States and Iran hold fundamentally different visions of the region’s post-war order. Upcoming negotiations, and the willingness of both sides to reach a compromise, will be crucial for further developments. However, both actors are attempting to portray the current situation as their own victory and perceive themselves as holding the upper hand, which may significantly complicate the anticipated talks in Islamabad. Their demands currently appear difficult to reconcile. As a result, the ceasefire may represent only a temporary pause allowing both sides to regroup and rearm, rather than a genuine step toward de-escalation. The conflict may therefore continue in recurring cycles of “escalation – ceasefire – negotiations – escalation.”